Abstract-We consider the problem of increasing the threshold parameter of a secret-sharing scheme after the setup (share distribution) phase, without further communication between the dealer and the shareholders. Previous solutions to this problem require one to start off with a nonstandard scheme designed specifically for this purpose, or to have communication between shareholders. In contrast, we show how to increase the threshold parameter of the standard Shamir secret-sharing scheme without communication between the shareholders. Our technique can thus be applied to existing Shamir schemes even if they were set up without consideration to future threshold increases.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A -threshold secret-sharing scheme is a fundamental cryptographic primitive, which allows a dealer owning a secret to distribute this secret among a group of shareholders in such a way that any shareholders can reconstruct the secret, but no subset of less than shareholders can gain information on the secret. Classical constructions for -threshold secret-sharing schemes include the polynomial-based Shamir scheme [1] and the integer-based Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) scheme [2] .
A common application for -threshold secret-sharing schemes is for achieving robustness of distributed security systems. A distributed system is called robust if system security is maintained even against an attacker who manages to break into/eavesdrop up to a certain number of components of the distributed system. For example, access control to a system can be enforced using a secret shared among system servers using a -threshold secret-sharing scheme, while maintaining security if less than servers are compromised. In such applications, the threshold parameter must be determined by a security policy, based on an assessment which is a compromise between the value of the protected system and attacker capabilities on the one hand (which require as high a threshold as possible) and user convenience and cost on the other hand (which require as low a threshold as possible). In many settings, the system value and attacker capabilities are likely to change over time, thus requiring the security policy and hence threshold parameter to vary over time. In particular, an increase in system value or attacker capabilities after the initial setup with a relatively low threshold parameter , will require an increase in the threshold parameter to a higher value . The longer the lifetime of the system, the more likely that such a change will be needed. Note that we assume that all shareholders will cooperate honestly in making the transition to the larger threshold , since the attacker in our setting is an outsider.
Previous Solutions: A trivial solution to the problem of increasing the threshold parameter of a -threshold secretsharing scheme to is for the shareholders to discard their old shares and for the dealer to distribute new shares of a -threshold secret-sharing scheme to all shareholders. However, this solution is not very attractive, since it requires the dealer to be involved after the setup stage and moreover requires communication between the dealer and each shareholder (such communication may be difficult to establish after the initial setup stage).
A much better solution would allow the threshold to be changed at any time without any communication between the dealer and shareholders after the setup stage. We say that such schemes allow dealer-free threshold changeability. A trivial dealer-free threshold changeable scheme can be constructed as follows: the dealer initially sets up threshold schemes for each possible future threshold , and gives to each shareholder shares of the secret. Namely, for each , the shareholder receives a share of the secret for a -threshold scheme. Such a trivial scheme may not be applicable because of the following drawbacks.
(1) Nonstandard Initial Scheme: The dealer must plan ahead for future threshold increases by initially setting up a nonstandard -threshold scheme designed specifically for threshold changeability, whose shares consist of shares corresponding to the underlying -threshold schemes. Hence, the trivial 0018-9448/$25.00 © 2007 IEEE
scheme cannot be applied to increase the threshold of existing standard Shamir -threshold schemes which were not originally designed for threshold changeability and in which each shareholder has only a single share of one Shamir -threshold scheme. (2) Large Storage/Communication Requirements for Shareholders: Each shareholder must receive and store shares, where each share is as long as the secret (assuming that perfect security is desired). Hence, the trivial scheme cannot be applied when storage or communication costs for shares are prohibitive. Other "dealer-free" solutions to the threshold increase problem have been proposed in the literature (see related work below), but they all suffer from at least one of the two drawbacks above, or they require communication between the shareholders.
Our Contributions: In this paper, we present a new method for increasing the threshold of the standard Shamir -threshold secret-sharing scheme [1] , which does not have any of the drawbacks discussed above. In particular, and in contrast to previous solutions, our method does not require communication between the dealer and shareholders after the initial setup stage nor between shareholders, and can be applied to existing Shamir schemes even if they were set up without consideration to future threshold increase. Storage and communication costs are the same as for the standard Shamir scheme.
The basic idea of our method is the following: to increase the threshold from to , the shareholders add an appropriate amount of random noise to their shares (or delete a certain fraction of the bits of their share) to compute subshares which contain partial information about (e.g., half the most significant bits of) the original shares. Since the subshares contain only partial information about the original shares, a set of subshares may no longer be sufficient to reconstruct the secret uniquely, but if one observes a sufficiently larger number of subshares then one can expect the secret to be uniquely determined by these subshares (e.g., if the subshares contain only half the information in the original shares then one can expect that subshares will uniquely determine the secret). 1 By replacing the share combiner algorithm of the original -threshold secret-sharing with an appropriate "error-correction" algorithm which can uniquely recover the secret from any subshares, we obtain the desired threshold increase from to , leaving the secret unchanged. Note that the only communication required for increasing the threshold is a public signal broadcast by the share combiner to instruct the shareholders to modify their shares.
Our efficient "error-correction" combiner algorithm for the Shamir secret-sharing scheme is constructed using lattice basis reduction techniques. Thus, our method is a new positive cryptographic application for lattice reduction algorithms. Furthermore, we make use of fundamental tools from the theory of lattices (geometry of numbers) to prove quantitative statements about the information-theoretic security and correctness of our construction. These lattice-based security proof techniques may be of independent interest. Although our threshold-increase method does not yield a perfect -threshold secret-sharing scheme, we obtain a useful result about the information-theoretic security of our method, which we believe suffices for many applications. Roughly speaking, we prove that for any desired , our method can be used to change the threshold to (meaning that any subshares can be used to recover the secret) such that any observed subshares leak to the attacker at most a fraction of the entropy of the secret, where can be made as small as we wish by an appropriate choice of security parameter.
Interestingly, our lattice-based methods can be adapted also to change the threshold of the standard integer-based CRT secretsharing scheme [2] . The basic common structure of the CRT and Shamir schemes that allows us to apply lattice techniques in both cases is that the shares can be expressed as known integer linear combinations of one or more secret integers modulo other known integers. The differences between the schemes arise from the structure of the different sets the above integers are chosen from, namely, a set of prime moduli in the CRT scheme, or a set of polynomials in the Shamir scheme, and accordingly, we use the different (but analogous) properties of those sets to prove bounds on the properties of the different (but analogous) lattices involved in our scheme (e.g., the length of shortest vectors in the lattice). We provide full details of our results for the threshold changeable CRT scheme in a companion paper [3] .
Related Work: Several approaches to changing the parameters of a threshold scheme in the absence of the dealer have been proposed in the literature. The technique of secret redistribution [4] , [5] involves communication among the shareholders to "redistribute" the secret with the new threshold parameter. Although this technique can be applied to standard secret-sharing schemes, its disadvantage is the need for secure channels for communication between shareholders. Methods for changing threshold which do not require secure channels have been studied in [6] - [10] , but they all require the initial secret-sharing scheme to be a nonstandard one, specially designed for threshold increase (as a simple example of such a nonstandard scheme, the dealer could provide each shareholder with two shares of the secret: one share for a -threshold scheme and one share for a -threshold scheme). On the other hand, some of these nonstandard schemes allow the secret to be changed for the new -threshold scheme, so their security is maintained even if the shares of the original -threshold scheme are known (while in our scheme, the secret for the -threshold scheme is the same as the secret for the original -threshold scheme and hence we cannot achieve security for observed subshares). Nevertheless, for security against outsiders breaking into honest shareholders' systems, it is reasonable to assume that shareholders will delete their original shares to protect against future outsider intrusions, so for such applications the weaker security property of our scheme should suffice.
Our scheme uses a lattice-based "error-correction" algorithm which is a slight variant of an algorithm for "noisy polynomial approximation" with noise bounded in the Lee norm [11] . This algorithm in turn is one of a large body of recent work on "list decoding" of Reed-Solomon and CRT codes [12] - [15] . We re-mark also that although the correctness proof of our scheme is based on the work of [11] , our security proof is new and the lattice-based techniques used may be of independent interest.
We would also like to comment on the relation between our threshold increase method and the method for making secret-sharing schemes robust against cheating shareholders using error correction [16] . In both methods, the share combiner (for a scheme with threshold ) receives "noisy" shares and applies an error-correction algorithm to overcome the noise and recover the secret. However, the type of noise which needs to be corrected (and hence also the decoding algorithm) is inherently different in the two cases. In the cheater robustness case, the noise vector (whose th entry is the additive error in the th share) is bounded in the Hamming norm: if the number of cheating shareholders is at most then we know that up to of the shares will be arbitrarily corrupted while the remaining shares will be correct. In our threshold increase case, the noise vector is bounded in the Lee norm: we have that all shares are corrupted but only by a small (in absolute value) additive noise. Note that a Hamming-bounded noise is not suitable for our threshold-increase method: we require that all shares be corrupted in an identical manner, to ensure that any subset of shareholders cannot obtain information on the secret, and any subset of shareholders can recover the secret. On the other hand, our Lee-bounded noise error-correction method cannot handle the Hamming-bounded noise where some shares are arbitrarily corrupted.
Organization of This Paper: Section II presents notations, known results on lattices, and a counting lemma that we use. In Section III, we provide definitions of changeable-threshold secret-sharing schemes and their correctness/security notions. In Section IV, we present the original Shamir -threshold secret-sharing scheme, and our threshold-changing algorithms to increase the threshold to . We then provide concrete proofs of the correctness and security properties of our scheme. Section V concludes the paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES

A. Notation
Sets. For a finite set , we denote by the size of . For any set and integer , we denote by the set of all -tuples of elements from and by the set of all -tuples of distinct elements from . For integer , we denote by the set . We use to denote the set of integers greater than and less than . Entropy. We denote by the logarithm function with base . For a discrete random variable with probability distribution on a set , we denote by the Shannon entropy of . Let denote the conditional probability distribution of given the event . We denote by the conditional entropy of given the event .
B. Lattices
Here we collect several known results that we use about lattices, which can be found in [17] - [19] . Let be a set of linearly independent vectors in . The set Z Z is called an -dimensional (full-rank) lattice with basis . Given a basis for a lattice , we define the associated basis matrix to be the (full-rank) matrix whose th row is the th basis vector for . The quantity is independent of the choice of basis . It is called the determinant of the lattice and denoted by . Given a basis for lattice , the problem of finding a shortest nonzero vector in is known as the shortest vector problem, or SVP. An algorithm is called an SVP approximation algorithm with -approximation factor if it is guaranteed to find a nonzero lattice vector such that . The celebrated LLL algorithm of Lenstra, Lenstra, and Lovász [20] is an SVP approximation algorithm with polynomial running time (in the total bit length of the rational input basis) which achieves -approximation factor . In this paper we actually need to solve a variation of SVP called the closest vector problem (CVP): given a basis of a lattice in and a "target" vector , find a lattice vector such that is minimized. An algorithm is called a CVP approximation algorithm with -approximation factor if it is guaranteed to find a lattice vector such that . Babai [21] has shown how to convert the LLL algorithm into a polynomial running time CVP approximation algorithm which achieves -approximation factor . In our proof of security, we use several fundamental theorems from the theory of lattices. The original theorems are quite general, but the restricted versions stated below suffice for our purposes. First, we need the following definition of successive Minkowski minima of a lattice.
Definition 1 (Minkowski Minima):
Let be a lattice in . For , the th successive Minkowski minimum of , denoted
, is the smallest real number such that there exists a set of linearly independent vectors in with for all .
Note that is just the shortest infinity norm over all nonzero vectors in . Note that usual definitions of Minkowski minima refer to the Euclidean norm, whereas we use the infinity norm. Next, we state Minkowski's "first theorem."
Theorem 1 (Minkowski's First Theorem):
Let be a lattice in and let denote the first Minkowski minimum of (see Definition 1). Then .
We will use the following point-counting variant of Minkowski's "first theorem," which is due to Blichfeldt and van der Corput (see [17] ).
Theorem 2 (Blichfeldt-Corput):
Let be a lattice in and let denote the origin-centered box of volume . Then the number of points of the lattice contained in the box is at least .
Finally, we will also make use of Minkowski's "second theorem" [17] .
Theorem 3 (Minkowski's Second Theorem):
Let be a full-rank lattice in and let denote the Minkowski minima of (see Definition 1). Then .
C. An Algebraic Counting Lemma
The following is a fundamental lemma that we use, interestingly, for both the correctness and security proofs of our construction. Fix a prime defining the finite field Z Z , positive integer parameters , and an arbitrary set of polynomials of degree at least and at most over Z Z . The lemma gives us an upper bound on the probability that, for randomly chosen elements of Z Z , there will exist a polynomial which has "small" absolute value modulo (less than ) at all the points . We remark that a similar (and more general) lemma was used in the analysis of a polynomial approximation algorithm [11] . Note that the lemma does not hold in general if we allow to contain constant polynomials, since these polynomials may have constant coefficient smaller than .
Lemma 1: Fix a prime , positive integers
, and a nonempty set of polynomials of degree at least and at most with coefficients in Z Z . Let Z Z denote the set of vectors Z Z for which there exists a polynomial such that for all . The size of the set is upper-bounded as follows:
Proof: Suppose that Z Z is such that there exists a polynomial such that for (1) It follows that there exist integers such that, for each , we have with and hence is a zero of the polynomial over Z Z . But for each , is a polynomial of degree at least and at most over Z Z and hence has at most zeros in Z Z . So for each possible value for and , there are at most "bad" values for in Z Z such that (1) holds. Using the fact that there are fewer than possible values for and fewer than possible values for , the claimed bound follows.
III. DEFINITION OF CHANGEABLE-THRESHOLD SECRET-SHARING SCHEMES
We will use the following definition of a threshold secretsharing scheme, which is a slight modification of the definition in [22] .
Definition 2 (Threshold Scheme):
A -threshold secretsharing scheme consists of three efficient algorithms.
1)
(Public Parameter Generation): Takes as input a security parameter and returns a string of public parameters.
2) (Dealer Setup): Takes as input a security/public parameter pair and a secret from the secret space and returns a list of shares , where is in the th share space for . We denote by the mapping induced by algorithm (here denotes the space of random inputs to the probabilistic algorithm ).
3) (Share Combiner): Takes as input a security/public parameter pair and any subset of out of the shares, and returns a recovered secret (here denotes a subset of of size ).
The correctness and security properties of a -threshold secret-sharing scheme can be quantified by the following definitions, which are modifications of those in [22] .
Definition 3 (Correctness, Security):
A -threshold secret-sharing scheme is said to be 1) -correct: If the secret recovery may fail only for a "bad" set of public parameters with probability at most . Precisely, is the probability (over The following definition of the Threshold Changeability without dealer assistance for a secret-sharing scheme is a modification of the definition in [8] . The idea captured by the preceding definition is that the change of threshold from to is implemented by getting each shareholder to replace his original share by the subshare output by the subshare generation algorithm (the original share is then discarded).
Definition 4 (Threshold Changeability
)
Remark on Outsider Versus Insider Attacks:
Our security model addresses a passive outsider attacker that can only observe up to subshares. Accordingly, we assume that shareholders cooperate honestly in updating their shares to a higher threshold to protect against such outsider attacks. We also assume that the outsider attacker only sees subshares of the new scheme, rather than also shares of the original scheme. This does not model attackers who store some shares of the original scheme, and then try to use those in conjunction with some subshares of the new scheme to recover the secret. Our security analysis can be adapted to this case to show that the subshare security threshold against such attackers drops by about for each additional observed original share.
Remark on -Correctness of a -Threshold Scheme:
The -correctness requirement, although probabilistic, is quite strong since it is only probabilistic in the choice of public parameter but not in the choice of the secret and the randomness used to generate the shares and subshares: for the "good" values of , the share combiner is guaranteed to recover the secret, whatever the value of the secret and the values of the randomness used by the dealer and shareholders during subshare generation.
Remarks on
-Security: The requirement guarantees that with at least probability, will output a "good" scheme parameter for which any observed shares leak at most bits of entropy of the secret . Note that 1) the requirement that for all is a worst case requirement and hence stronger than only requiring that the average value of over the (which is known as the average mutual information between the secret and the share vector) is at most ; and 2) when the secret is uniformly distributed, the asymptotic -security requirement says that the fraction of secret entropy which is leaked to the attacker by observed shares can be made as small as we wish with a suitably large security parameter .
IV. THRESHOLD CHANGEABILITY FOR SHAMIR SECRET-SHARING
A. The Standard Shamir Scheme
The standard Shamir -threshold secret sharing scheme is defined as follows. Intuition: To get some intuition for the correctness of the subshare combiner algorithm, observe that lattice is constructed to contain a lattice vector related to the secret polynomial , while the target vector is "close" to the lattice vector , so we may hope that the CVP approximation algorithm will return , from which the coefficients of the secret polynomial, and hence the secret , can be easily recovered. Namely, consider the lattice vector obtained by multiplying (for ) the th row of basis matrix by the (integer) coefficient of in the secret polynomial , adding up these scaled row vectors, and then subtracting the appropriate integer multiples of the first rows of in order to reduce modulo the first coordinates of the resulting vector . Since the th row of contains in its first coordinates the values of the monomial at the points , it follows that the first coordinates of the lattice vector contains integers congruent to modulo . Hence, with the appropriate choice of the first row multipliers for reduction, the first coordinates of differ from the corresponding subshares (the first coordinates of the target vector ) by the "small" noise integers (with ) added by the subshare generation algorithm. Consequently, is "close" to , and we may hope that it will be recovered by . In our proof of correctness in Section IV-D, we show that, with high probability over the choice of the 's and for sufficiently large security parameters, is indeed the closest vector in to by a sufficient margin to guarantee that CVP approximation algorithm returns . Note that the last coordinates of contain the (scaled) coefficients of the secret polynomial , including the secret .
Scheme
Remark 1 (Unique Secret Recovery):
The reason for multiplying the shares by before adding the noise , is that otherwise, the secret may not be uniquely recoverable, even given all noisy subshares. Indeed and, typically, , so the subshare vector for secret with noise integers would be equal to, and hence indistinguishable from, the subshare vector for secret with noise integers . In contrast, in our scheme (with multiplication by ) subshare vectors of any two distinct secrets (containing at least subshares) are unequal except with small probability (less than ) over the random choice of 's. To understand the reason for this, note that the th subshares of and are of the form and , respectively, where polynomials and differ in their constant coefficients and respectively. So an equality of subshares for implies that i.e., the polynomial has a "small" value (less than in absolute value) at the points modulo . The crucial point is that has degree at least (thanks to the multiplication of ) and at most , so, as shown in Lemma 1,
can have "small" values (less than in absolute value) only at a relatively small "bad" set of up to points in Z Z , and this "bad" set is unlikely to be hit by all the randomly chosen 's when is sufficiently large. More precisely, since there are fewer than possibilities for , then, applying Lemma 1, the chance that a particular set of 's will all be "bad" (and hence the corresponding subshare vectors of and will be equal) is at most . The error probability bound we obtain for our subshare recovery algorithm is close to this bound, (see (4) in the proof of Theorem 4). Note also that the above nonuniqueness probability upper bound is nontrivial (less than ) when This is close to the secret recovery condition obtained from following the heuristic intuitive reasoning discussed in Section I, where we expect that each noisy subshare contains a fraction of about of the bits of information about the secret polynomial in the original share, due to the addition of about bits of noise to the share. Namely, assuming the information on provided by distinct subshares is additive, we heuristically expect to recover uniquely once the total information contained in the subshares exceeds the total information in .
Remark 2: Our method of adding a "small" random noise integer with to the share multiple modulo is essentially equivalent (in the sense of information on the secret) to passing the residues through a deterministic function which chops off the least-significant bits of the -bit residues , and this also yields shorter subshares than in our method above. However, since reducing the length of the original shares is not our main goal, we have chosen to present our scheme as above to simplify the analysis.
Remark 3:
Some special variants of the Shamir scheme use special values for the points , such as for , to which the above method does not apply, because of its reliance on the random choice of the 's. However, it turns out that our method can be modified to work even for these special Shamir variants. The idea is to make up for the loss of randomness in the 's by getting the shareholders to multiply their shares by additional random integers (say Z Z ) prior to adding the random noise . The 's are then sent along to the combiner with the noisy subshares. We do not analyze this variant of our scheme in this paper.
Remark 4:
The scheme allows more than one successive increase in the threshold by adding "additional" noise as required. For example, suppose is the th subshare after increasing the threshold from to by adding random "noise" integer , and supppose that for some integer is the noise bound required by our scheme for increasing the threshold from to . Then the th shareholder can simulate the threshold increase from to by choosing a uniformly random integer with and modifying the th subshare to a new subshare , where integer . Note that is almost uniformly random in interval when is uniform in and is uniform in , as required for changing to threshold .
Remark 5:
As we show in Sections IV-C-E, the choice achieves both asymptotic correctness and security.
C. Summary of Analysis Results
Our analysis results can be summarized by two main theorems.
The first theorem shows that the choice of the parameter used in our threshold changing algorithm is sufficient to guarantee the -correctness of our scheme for all sufficiently large security parameters.
Theorem 4 (Correctness):
The scheme with parameter choice is asymptotically correct. Concretely, for any choice of parameter , the -threshold scheme is -correct for all security parameters satisfying the inequality , where
The concrete security of our scheme is given by the second theorem. It shows that, for fixed and with parameter choice , the -threshold scheme leaks at most fraction of the entropy of the secret to an attacker observing less than subshares (for all except a fraction of public parameters).
Theorem 5 (Security):
The scheme with parameter choice is asymptotically -secure with respect to the uniform probability distribution of the secret on Z Z . Concretely, for any parameter choice , the -threshold scheme is -secure with for all security parameters , where, letting and defining as in Theorem 4, we have with We would like to make a couple of remarks on the security of our scheme.
First, the limitation for (close to perfect) security is inherent to schemes which increase the threshold by adding small noise to shares, and is not due to our Shamir-based implementation. As remarked in Section IV-B, our approach of increasing the threshold from to by adding small noise integers of bit length to the bits shares is essentially equivalent to truncating the shares to just their most significant bits for . The information-theoretic security limitations of such schemes have been studied in [8] , where it is pointed out that for any initial perfect -threshold scheme with a bits secret and bits shares, the -threshold scheme obtained by truncating shares to bits is a ramp scheme [23] , [24] . It is known [23] , [24] that in any such ramp scheme, the entropy of the secret given observed shares (which is obviously zero for and equal to for ) is upper-bounded by in the ramp region . It follows that for our scheme with , the entropy of the secret is substantially less than bits (so that perfect security cannot be achieved) when subshares are observed, matching asymptotically for (up to a factor ) the upper bound on for which our security result in Theorem 5 applies. On the other hand, in the case , it is an interesting open problem whether our bound in Theorem 5 on the absolute secret entropy leaked by the observed subshares is essentially tight or can be improved.
Second, we note that although we state in Theorem 5 a lower bound on the conditional Shannon entropy of the secret for any observed share value , our proof shows the stronger result that the stated bound is also a lower bound on the conditional min-entropy and hence also a lower bound on the conditional Rényi entropy of given . This means we can apply the privacy amplification results of [25] to derive a secret (by hashing with a public randomly chosen function from a universal hash family) such that a provably negligible absolute amount of entropy of is leaked by the observed shares .
Before we present the proofs of these theorems, let us present some example parameter settings.
Example 1 (Concrete): Suppose we have
shareholders sharing a secret of length 1000 bits (using a prime modulus ) with an original threshold , and we wish to increase the threshold to with correctness (subshare combiner error probability less than in a million). We have , . The lattice used by the subshare combiner has dimension . Assume we use the Babai CVP approximation algorithm which has infinity-norm approximation factor so . The subshare combiner parameters are , noise bit-length fraction , and noise bound . By Theorem 4, the subshare combiner will achieve correctness using subshares as long as we use a security parameter greater or equal to which is satisfied by our choice . The security result Theorem 5 applies against attackers observing up to shares, where . Notice that this "security threshold" is lower than by about (this is essentially due to the fact that each subshare contains only approximately a fraction of the information in the original share, hence, by correctness, for observed subshares a constant fraction of the secret entropy leaks to the attacker). For observed shares, except for a probability of at most over the choice of the 's, the entropy leaked to the attacker is at most 104.8 bits (about 10% of the secret entropy). This bound holds for security parameters exceeding 820 bits, which is satisfied by our choice .
Example 2 (Asymptotic):
Asymptotically, suppose that we let the original threshold grow and set and for some constants , using security parameter for some constant so , and we require correctness for some constant . The lattice dimension is , Babai approximation factor , and hence, the subshare combiner parameters increase as follows:
, , noise bit-length fraction approaches , and noise bound approaches . The subshare combiner result Theorem 4 holds for secrets of lengths at least , while the security result Theorem 5 holds for secrets of lengths at least , so both requirements can be satisfied by our choice with a suitable choice for , giving an entropy loss bound for up to , which approaches for large , while the fraction of secret entropy lost approaches zero for large .
D. Proof of Correctness
In this subsection, we present a proof of our correctness result (Theorem 4).
Let us fix a subshare subset with . As explained in Section IV-B, we know by construction of lattice in the subshare combiner algorithm, that the dealer's secret polynomial Z Z gives rise to a lattice vector having its first coordinates congruent modulo to the values of the secret polynomial at the points , and the last coordinates equal to the scaled coefficients of . Namely, for , let , where Z Z is the multiple of which should be subtracted from the integer to reduce it modulo and obtain the value of the th subshare. Then the lattice vector is "close" to the target vector
In particular we have, using for all , that . Consequently, since is a CVP approximation algorithm with approximation factor , its output lattice vector will also be "close" to the target vector; namely, we have . Applying the triangle inequality, we conclude that the lattice vector satisfies (2) Now, either in which case the combiner succeeds to recover secret , or otherwise we have the following "bad" case:
Hence, for fixed , the combiner succeeds except for a fraction of "bad" choices of Z Z , for which contains a "short" and "bad" vector satisfying (2) and (3). To upper-bound , consider the polynomial Note that, since , we have and hence for all using (2) . Also, has zero constant coefficient and degree at least and at most over Z Z using (3). Applying Lemma 1 (with parameters , , ) we conclude that such a "bad" polynomial exists for at most a fraction Z Z of Z Z , for each fixed . Hence, the probability that a uniformly chosen Z Z is "bad" for some with upper-bounded as
A straightforward calculation detailed below shows that the right-hand side of (4) is upper-bounded by for all satisfying the inequality , where as claimed. To show the asymptotic correctness (for fixed , , , and increasing security parameter ), note that with parameter choice , we have so, for any fixed , we achieve -correctness whenever the conditions and both hold. Recalling that depends only on the lattice dimension but not on we have, since , that both of the latter conditions sufficient for achieving -correctness are satisfied for all sufficiently large , as claimed.
We now show the remaining claim that the right-hand side of (4) is upper-bounded by for all , with First, observe that implies . Indeed, using , the condition is implied by the condition . Plugging in the parameter choices and , we find that is equivalent to the condition as claimed. The condition that the right-hand side of (4) is upper-bounded by can be written as (5) where Z Z . Rearranging this condition, and plugging in gives the equivalent condition (6) Using and , we see that (6) is implied by the condition (7) Now observe that since , so implies and hence . Using this bound we get, for that (8) Plugging (8) and the bounds and into (7) we get assuming the sufficient condition which is satisfied by the parameter choice This shows that the right-hand side of (4) is upper-bounded by for all , as claimed, which completes the proof of the theorem.
E. Proof of Security
This section contains a proof of our security result (Theorem 5).
Fix an observed subshare subset of of size and observed subshare values Z Z . Using the fact that the polynomial Z Z and the noise vector are chosen uniformly at random, the conditional probability of the secret taking the value Z Z given that the observed subshare vector takes the value is given by where Z Z , and for . Since , we know that for each Z Z there is at most one such that for all . Therefore, the above expression simplifies to (9) where, for any integers and , we define the set
We will derive a probabilistic lower bound on and upper bound on which both hold for all except a fraction of "bad" choices for Z Z assuming (with , , and defined in the theorem statement). We then apply these bounds to (9) to get a bound for all (with defined in the theorem statement) so that for fixed , entropy loss is bounded as , except for the fraction of Z Z . It then follows that for all with except for a fraction of Z Z assuming that , which proves the theorem. Reduction to Lattice Point Counting: We now derive the desired probabilistic upper and lower bounds on . As a first step, we reduce the problem to a lattice "point-counting" problem. The following lemma shows that is equal to the number of points of a certain lattice (closely related to the lattice used in our subshare combiner algorithm) contained in a -dimensional box of side length , centered on a certain nonlattice vector (for improved readability, we have placed the proofs of the following and subsequent lemmas in separate appendices at the end of the paper). Guiding Heuristics: Before we present our rigorous upper and lower bounds on the number of lattice points in the box we explain some guiding geometric heuristics which our results make rigorous, in order to give more insight into the problem. As illustrated in Fig. 1(a) for the two-dimensional case, it is well known that the determinant of a lattice in is the volume of any "fundamental parallelepiped" (f.p.) of the lattice which tiles the space (where for a lattice with basis vectors we define the associated f.p. as the set over all real-valued coefficients ). Hence, each f.p. is associated with a unique lattice point in which serves as the origin of the f.p. So, given a box in having a volume which is sufficiently large compared to the f.p. volume , we expect that the volume ratio would give a good estimate for the number of points of contained in . For our problem, the box has volume , compared to , so according to the above heuristic, we expect that (for the case ) and for , which implies the desired security result
The validity condition is , which implies, using , the expected bound on the number of observed shares. Our proof below makes the above heuristic estimates rigorous and gives quantitative bounds on the estimation errors involved. In particular, one central issue addressed by our proof (in Lemma 4) is upper-bounding the probability of "bad" instances of the lattice having very "unbalanced" f.p. due to the existence of short lattice vectors of norm much smaller than the Minkowski bound . As illustrated in Fig. 1(b) , for such "bad" lattices the number of lattice points in the box could be much smaller than the heuristic estimate , but fortunately, we show that the probability of such "bad" instances of the lattice is small when the 's are chosen at random. We now proceed to present our rigorous probabilistic lower and upper bounds on .
1) Finding a Lower Bound on
: Lower bounding the number of points of the lattice in a symmetric box centered on vector seems a difficult "nonhomogenous" problem because is in general not a lattice vector. But by "rounding" to a nearby lattice vector (with rounding error ), we reduce the problem to two simpler problems: 1) The "homogenous" problem of lower-bounding the number of lattice points in an origin-centered box and 2) upper-bounding the largest Minkowski minimum of the lattice. This general reduction is stated precisely as follows.
Lemma 3:
For any full-rank lattice in , vector , and , we have where .
To solve the "homogenous" counting problem 1) above, we directly apply the Blichfeldt-Corput theorem (Theorem 2 in Section II). To solve the problem 2) above, of upper bounding , we apply Minkowski's "second theorem" (Theorem 3 in Section II) to reduce this problem further to the problem of lower-bounding the first Minkowski minimum . Namely, since for all , then Minkowski's second theorem gives (10) Finally, to lower-bound (i.e., the infinity norm of the shortest nonzero vector in ), we use a probabilistic argument based on the algebraic counting Lemma 1 (similar to the argument used in proving Theorem 4), to obtain the following result. Note that Lemma 4 would not make sense if the conditions (12) and (14) depended on the choice of ; however, this is not the case since and are fixed independent of .
Lemma 4: Fix positive integers
and a positive real number , such that is a prime satisfying (11) and . For each Z Z , let denote the lattice in with basis matrix defined in Lemma 2, and let denote the lattice in with basis matrix obtained from by removing the th row and column. In the case , if (12) then, for at least a fraction of Z Z we have (13) In the case , if (14) then, for at least a fraction of Z Z we have (15) Combining the above results (for ) we obtain the desired lower bound on , subject to several conditions. The details follow.
Let us fix , whose actual value will be chosen later. We will say that Z Z is bad if one of the bounds (13) or (15) does not hold for this . According to Lemma 4, if conditions (11), (12) , and (14) are satisfied by , then the fraction of bad in Z Z is upper-bounded as (16) Throughout the following derivation we assume that is not bad. Plugging the lower bound (13) in the inequality (10) resulting from Minkowski's second theorem gives (17) Hence, applying Lemma 3 we have where So, if the condition (18) holds, then (19) where we have used the Blichfeldt-Corput theorem (Theorem 2) to obtain the last inequality. Using for all , we find that (19) implies, assuming in addition (20) that (21) Observe that our assumed condition (20) is equivalent to and, hence, recalling that , our condition (18) implies both conditions (20) and the right-hand side of (12) . We conclude that the lower bound (21) holds assuming that is not bad, (11) holds, the left-hand side of (12) Assuming that is not bad (using same definition of badness as above) and that conditions (11) and (14) hold, we can apply the lower bound (15) on to obtain the upper bound (22) where . Using for , we find that (22) implies, assuming in addition (23) that (24) Observe that our assumed condition (23) is implied by the righthand side of (14) . We conclude that the upper bound (24) holds assuming that is not bad and that conditions (11) and (14) hold.
Putting it Together: We now put together the above results. Let us assume that the parameters satisfy all the sufficient conditions specified above for the bounds (21) and (24) to hold for nonbad choices of ; namely, the assumed conditions are (11) , left-hand side of (12), (18) , and (14) (below we will show that all these conditions are satisfied if and , , and are chosen as in the theorem statement). Then, for each fixed with , for all except a fraction of bad Z Z (with upper-bounded in (16)), plugging the bounds (21) and (24) in (9) (using and by Lemma 2) we find for all Z Z and Z Z (where we have used and ) and, hence, conditional entropy is bounded as and entropy loss is bounded as (25) for all Z Z , as claimed in the theorem statement. From (16), the bound (25) holds for each fixed for all except a fraction of bad Z Z . Hence, for each fixed , (25) holds except with probability at most over the uniformly random choice of Z Z . Finally, by the union bound it follows that (25) holds for all with except with probability at most over the uniform choice of Z Z , as claimed in the theorem statement, assuming we set the parameter to the value (26) as defined in the theorem statement. It remains to show that the conditions assumed above, namely, (11), left inequality of (12), (18) , and (14) , are all satisfied if and , and are chosen as in the theorem statement.
First, we note that (11) is satisfied. This is because by definition we have since , and also , so as claimed. Next, we show that the left inequalities of both (12) and (14) are satisfied. Recall that and . Thus, the left inequality of (12) is equivalent to while the left inequality of (14) is equivalent to . So using (11) and we know that the left inequality of (12) implies the left inequality of (14) . So it suffices to show that (27) To do so, note that we may assume that (since for , the scheme clearly has perfect security thanks to the perfect security of the original -threshold Shamir scheme ). Thus, and (27) we see that the right-hand side of (32) is equal to which is less than , so implies (32), and hence the left inequalities of both (12) and (14) are satisfied, as claimed.
We now show that the right inequality of (14) implies (18) . Recalling that we see that the right inequality of (14) implies (18) where , and condition (34) holds by the theorem hypothesis . Hence, the right inequality of (14) implies (18), as claimed.
Finally, we show that the right inequality of (14) is satisfied. Recalling that , we see that the right inequality of (14) (37) is satisfied by the choice of the theorem statement. Therefore, the right inequality of (14) is satisfied. This completes the proof of the concrete claims of the theorem. To show the asymptotic security claim (for fixed , , , and increasing security parameter ) with parameter choice , observe that with this choice and so fractional entropy loss , and (recalling that is independent of ), we have so for all sufficiently large , as claimed. This completes the proof of the theorem.
An immediate consequence of the above results is the following.
Corollary 1: For any and , the standard Shamir -threshold secret-sharing scheme is asymptotically threshold-changeable to with respect to the uniform secret distribution.
V. CONCLUSION
We presented a new cryptographic application of lattice reduction techniques to achieve threshold changeability for the standard Shamir -threshold scheme. We proved concrete bounds on the correctness and security of our method, making use of fundamental results from lattice theory in our analysis.
Our scheme raises several open problems. In particular, our security result is proven to hold only for sufficiently long security parameters , whereas the correctness of the scheme holds for much smaller security parameters . Therefore, in order to improve the practicality of the security result, an interesting problem is to find an improved security proof which decreases the bound to
. A related open problem is to reduce the bound on the leaked secret entropy.
Finally, we wish to point out some limitations of our security model. In our security analysis, we have assumed a passive attacker which is assumed to be an outsider. In some cases, stronger security may be needed. For example, the threshold may be increased only after several shareholders have already been compromised by the attacker. Against such "insider attackers" who know some original shares, the information-theoretic threshold would be reduced below the desired value . The security analysis of our scheme can be adapted to this setting to show that the effective information-theoretic threshold is reduced to about against insider attackers knowing original shares, so this is a limitation of our approach (we note that if private shareholder communication is allowed, a known method of dealing with this problem is to use a share renewal protocol [26] ). Another security issue not handled by our scheme is "active attacks" by insiders who send corrupted subshares to the combiner to prevent recovery of the secret ("denial of service" attack).
APPENDIX A PROOF OF LEMMA 2
We define a mapping and show that is one to one and onto. We lower-bound the number of lattice points in the box of side length which is centered on the nonlattice vector , by the number of lattice points in the box of side length , which is centered on a lattice vector . We obtain the lattice vector by "rounding" the nonlattice vector to a "nearby" lattice vector. Suppose that the "rounding error" satisfies . Then it is easy to see by the triangle inequality that the box defined above is fully contained within the box , and thus the number of lattice points inside is indeed a lower bound on the number of lattice points in . In turn, since any lattice is invariant under additions of any lattice vector, it follows that the number of lattice points in the box is equal to the number of points in the origin-centered box , which is the desired result.
It remains to prove the claimed bound on the rounding error . 
Let us now consider the case . The existence of and satisfying (39) and (40) implies that is a polynomial in Z Z of degree at least (using (39)) and satisfying for all (using (40)). Also from (40), we know that the coefficients of satisfy and for all , so belongs to a subset of Z Z containing at most polynomials. Applying Lemma 1 (with parameters , , ) we conclude that such (and hence also and satisfying (39) and (40)) can exist for at most a fraction of Z Z , where
Now, using and we have so . Plugging this inequality in (41) we get
Observe that Z Z Z Z using , which follows from the lemma hypothesis that . Using this and the fact that we obtain
Hence, a sufficient condition for achieving is to pick as an integer in the interval such that the right-hand side of (43) is at most . Rearranging the latter sufficient condition for we get and Hence, it suffices to pick with the latter inequality satisfied (and also ) due to the lemma hypothesis that This establishes the claims of the lemma in the case . We now consider the remaining case . Notice that in this case we have from (39) that . If , it follows that the third case is not satisfied for any , so for , and from now on we may assume that . Then, the existence of and satisfying (39) and (40) implies that is a polynomial in Z Z of degree at least (using (39)) and satisfying for all (using (40)). Also, from (40) we know that the coefficients of satisfy and for , so belongs to a subset of Z Z containing at most polynomials. Applying Lemma 1 (with parameters , , ) we conclude that such (and hence also and satisfying (39) and Now, using the bounds , , and
